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In a recent paper Lynch has argued against expressivism as an account of 
claims about the value of truth.1 Since expressivism in its most theoretically 
virtuous forms aspires to be an account of all normative claims, expressivists 
need to address this argument.  
 
Consider the plausible normative claim:  
 
(TG) It is prima facie good that, relative to the propositions one might consider, 
one believe all and only those that are true. (Lynch, „Truth, Value and Epistemic 
Expressivism‟, p.78. Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent references are to 
this paper) 
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Lynch‟s question is whether expressivism can provide a plausible account of 
this claim. He understands expressivism as the view that normative claims, 
such as (TG), 
 
do not literally describe the world; they do not – in at least one sense – state 
facts. Rather they express our sentiments, or emotional attitudes, or convey our 
moral stances or commitments (p.76).  
 
So why think that expressivism, so understood, cannot provide an account of 
the (TG)? Lynch‟s argument can be summarised as follows.   
 
(1) In order for an expressivist account of any normative claim to make sense 
it must be possible to a reach a standpoint disengaged from the making of 
that normative claim (p.85). 
 
Hence, more particularly, 
 
(2) In order for an expressivist account of the normative claim (TG) to make 
sense, it must be possible to make sense of a standpoint disengaged from 





(3) It is not possible to make sense of an epistemically disengaged standpoint 
(„the epistemically disengaged standpoint is an illusion‟ – p.86). 








(4) An expressivist account of the normative claim (TG) doesn‟t make sense.  
 
 
One worry with this argument is that the conclusion is understated. It is not 
just expressivism that requires a standpoint disengaged from a particular 
normative commitment in order to be understood. Any theory that seeks to 
stand outside a particular normative commitment and give an account of what 
is involved in holding that commitment, without asserting the commitment 
itself, seems to require such a standpoint. Indeed, this „standing outside‟ of 
normative commitments and „placing‟ them in a wider understanding of the 
beings who hold them is one of the most commonly accepted desiderata of 
meta-normative theories.2. In so far as Lynch‟s argument suggests that, for 
the case of (TG), this desideratum cannot be satisfied, it counts against all 
meta-normative theories of (TG) that accept the desideratum of placement. 
This would include not merely expressive views, but realist views (according 
to which we can see normative commitments as representations of a genuine 
normative reality) and error-theoretical views (which agree with realists about 
the nature of the commitments, but disagree about the genuineness of 
normative reality). In other words, Lynch‟s argument, if successful, counts 
against all „external‟ or „Archimedean‟ views of normative commitments that is, 
views that provide „commentary on normative thinking, concepts, and their 
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truth-makers that [isn‟t] part of normative thinking itself‟ and therefore that 
„purport to stand outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a whole 
from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it‟.3   
 
Archimedeans, including expressivists, need not worry unduly, however, 
since Lynch‟s argument is not successful. It fails because premise (3) is false.  
 
To motivate this attack, first consider the intuitive implausibility of 
conclusion (4). This says that expressivism cannot give an account of the 
commitment expressed by a sincere assertion of (TG). But expressivism, as 
Lynch admits, is just the view that such assertions express attitudes, so the 
expressive account of (TG) is just that sincere utterance of (TG) expresses a 
pro-attitude to the state of affairs of believing (within a suitably defined range) 
all and only propositions that are true. This account may be implausible, but it 
is not unintelligible, as Lynch‟s conclusion claims. Something must have gone 
wrong. I suggest the problematic premise is (3).  
 
What is the „disengaged‟ standpoint that expressivism (or any 
Archimedean view) requires? Lynch does not give a general account, but 
does give two examples: of a morally disengaged standpoint and of an 
epistemically disengaged standpoint. First the morally disengaged standpoint 
is 
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the stance from which the expressivist wishes to „give a story about how ethical 
thought functions‟ (p.85) 
 
Further, such a standpoint is distinct from the stance we take when we 
„employ evaluative language‟ (p.85). As an example, a naturalistic view of 
human beings, which sees them as „frail complexes of perishable tissue‟ is 
commonly regarded as a disengaged standpoint from which we may hope to 
understand our moral commitments.4 Insofar as a naturalistic view of human 
beings does not seem to involve making any moral judgements about them, it 
is a morally disengaged standpoint. 
Since morality is just one example of a normative domain 
(epistemology another), we can generalise this account as follows. A 
standpoint is normatively disengaged insofar as (i) it attempts to explain what 
it is hold particular (type of) normative commitment and (ii) that explanation 
doesn‟t itself make any explicitly normative claims (of that type).  
Given this general account of a normatively disengaged standpoint, 
what of the possibility of an epistemically disengaged standpoint, that is, a 
„standpoint where we can explain our epistemic evaluations without engaging 
in them‟ (p.86)? Here the relevant epistemic evaluation is (TG). Lynch argues 
that an epistemically disengaged standpoint is not possible. But in fact there is 
a buried ambiguity in the notion of an epistemically disengaged standpoint 
that undermines Lynch‟s argument. We can distinguish:  
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(A1) The epistemically disengaged standpoint is a standpoint from which we 
can explain our commitment to epistemic evaluations (e.g. our commitment to 
(TG)) without thereby being committed to any such evaluations ourselves. 
 
(A2) The epistemically disengaged standpoint is a standpoint from which we 
can explain our commitment to epistemic evaluations (e.g. our commitment to 
(TG)) without thereby invoking any such evaluations in that explanation.  
 
(A1) is a stronger condition than (A2) and arguably cannot be met. The simple 
reason is given by Lynch. To attempt to explain our commitment to epistemic 
evaluations is a form of inquiry; to inquire is to figure out what to believe 
(p.89); and to believe is to accept the norm of truth for belief namely, that a 
belief is correct iff. it is true (p.79). Hence to inquire is to accept the norm of 
truth for belief. From here it is but a „quick step‟ (p.83) to commitment to (TG). 
In short, to seek an account of the nature of our commitment to (TG) is to 
seek a good account, and that in turn is to accept that a good account is one 
that is true – which is to accept the claim (TG). Hence, if an epistemically 
disengaged standpoint is one that seeks to explain the nature of our 
commitment to (TG) and yet does not involve making that commitment then 
Lynch is right that such a standpoint is impossible.  
 
Unfortunately for Lynch, this is not the sense of „epistemically 
disengaged standpoint‟ that expressivism (or any Archimedean view) requires 
– that is given by (A2). All that expressivism requires is that it is possible to 
give an explanation of our normative commitments (including the commitment 





to (TG)) that does not itself invoke normative claims like (TG) in that 
explanation.  It may well be that insofar as we are interested in expressivism 
we are interested in whether it is true, and thus we are considering it only 
because we are already committed to (TG). But this does not show that 
expressivism itself uses normative claims in its explanation of our normative 
commitments such as commitment to (TG). (Such an argument would in any 
case be too strong, for it would entail that all scientific theories are normative 
because their proponents accept the norm of truth.) All that is required for 
expressivism to be a „disengaged‟ view of normativity is that it explain our 
commitment to normative claims without employing normative claims in that 
explanation (clause (ii) above). More abstractly the point can be put by saying 
that there is a difference between the commitments to normative claims one 
acquires in considering whether to accept a theory (even a theory of 
normativity) and the normative claims of the theory itself. Commitment to (TG) 
may be of the former type, but (TG) itself is not of the latter type, and that is 
enough to make conceptual space for „disengaged‟ accounts of our 
commitment to it. 
 
Thus although there is a sense in which (3) is true – sense (A1) – it is 
not the sense that Lynch‟s argument requires. In the sense of „epistemically 
disengaged standpoint‟ that expressivism requires – sense (A2) – premise (3) 
is false.  
 
These reflections also allow us to say where Lynch‟s argument for (3) 
goes wrong. The argument is as follows: 






(3a) „if we are to make sense of an epistemically disengaged standpoint, we 
need to consider the possibility…that someone could engage in inquiry 
without being committed to (TG)‟ (p.86). 
 
(3b) It is not possible that someone could engage in inquiry without being 
committed to (TG) (p.86).  
 
This argument fails because (3a) is false. To make sense of an 
epistemically disengaged standpoint we need only make sense of an 
explanatory theory of our commitment to (TG) that doesn‟t involve the claim 
(TG) itself. This doesn‟t require imagining an agent or inquirer not committed 
to (TG), only imagining an explanation of that commitment that doesn‟t feature 
(TG) in the explanans. Thus Lynch‟s argument for premise (3b) – the example 
of King George (pp.86-90) – is beside the point.  
 
What can we learn from this? First, the Archimedean project of giving 
an external grounding for normativity is consistent with the claim that there are 
some normative commitments that all inquirers have. Should it turn out, for 
example, that there are some normative commitments that are constitutive of 
all inquirers (or even all agents) that would not determine how to understand 
those commitments. Generally, that a normative commitment is constitutive of 
inquiry, agency, humanity or whatever doesn‟t determine how to understand 
that commitment.  





Second, Lynch‟s argument is not completely undermined. In his 
conclusion Lynch claims:  
 
Our reflections suggest that unlike our other values we cannot sufficient abstract 
from the value of truth in order to be sceptical about it … What [this] tells us 
about value is that we cannot…take a skeptical attitude towards all of our values 
(p.95). 
 
Nothing I have said here undermines this conclusion. That is, for all I have 
said it may be that it is impossible for us to cease to value truth and still count 
as inquirers. That is, it may be that as inquirers we cannot cease to have the 
normative commitment expressed by (TG). Lynch goes on: 
 
In particular, we cannot take an expressivist attitude towards the value of truth 
(p.95). 
  
This does not follow from the previous conclusion and for the above reasons 
can be rejected. From the fact that a certain normative commitment is 
constitutive of inquirers nothing at all follows about how to understand that 
commitment. Further, Expressivism is not – as this passage suggests – a 
skeptical attitude towards the value of truth. It is an account of what it is to 
value something such as truth (or loyalty or friendship or counting blades of 
grass). To say that we cannot, while remaining inquirers, cease to value truth 
does not settle the question of what it is to value truth. It is the latter question 
to which expressivism is addressed and, for all Lynch argues, remains a 
coherent account. 
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